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[L. A. No. ~2890. In Bank. Mar. 5, 1954.] 
GUDHUN S. 'l'HOMPSON, as Administratrix, etc., Appel-
lant, v. SHERMAN LACEY, as Administrator, etc., 
Respondent. 
[1] Automobiles-Care as to Guests.-Ko person who as a guest 
accepts a ride in a vehicle without giving compensation has a 
right of action for damages against driver unless he estab-
lishes that damages were caused by intoxication or wilful mis-
conduct of driver. (Veh. Code, § 403.) 
[2] !d.-Care as to Guests-Passenger and Guest Distinguished.-
The designations "passenger" and "guest" have been adopted 
for purpose of distinguishing a person who has given com-
pensation within meaning of Veh. Code, § 403, from one 
carried gratuitously. 
[3] Id.-Care as to Guests-Who are Passengers.-Where several 
employees of a company in course of their employment are 
riding in an automobile of one of employeeR for purpose of 
attending a meeting called by company in connection with its 
business, and employee owning car receives mileage for its 
use in employer's business from employer who knows he is 
engaged in practice of transporting other employees on em-
ployer's business, owner of car receives a tangible benefit 
from employer, though it may be small, and employer receives 
an economic benefit because it would pay less traveling ex-
penses to its employees attending meeting by reason of ar-
rangement whereby only one employee would. receive mileage, 
since employer in effect is paying one employee to bring the 
others to meeting. 
[4] Id.-Care as to Guests-Who are Passengers.-Compensation 
for transportation in a vehicle need not be paid by the one 
transported in order to make it transportation for compensa-
tion under Veh. Code, § 403; it may be paid by someone other 
than rider. 
[5] Id.-Care as to Guests-Who are Passengers.-Where it may 
be inferred that act of one employee of company in driving 
other employees to company meeting in his automobile was 
for mutual economic benefit of all concerned, the company as 
well as employees, an employee who was killed during such 
transportation as result of collision with another vehicle was 
a passenger rather than a guest. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Automobiles, § 333 et seq.; Am.Jur., Auto-
mobiles, § 237 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Automobiles, § 123(1); [2-6] Auto-
mobiles, § 123(2). 
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[6] Id.-Care as to Guests-Who are Passengers.---Where driver 
of automobile receives a tangible benefit, monetary or other-
wise, which is a motivating influence for furnishing transpor-
tation, the rider is a passenger and driver is lin ble for orc1i-
nary negligence. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San 
Diego County. C. M. Monroe, Judge. Reversed. 
Action for damages for wrongful death arising out of an 
automobile accident. Judgment of nonsuit reversed. 
Luce, Forward, Kunzel & Scripps and Edgar A. Luce, Jr., 
for Appellant. 
Gray, Cary, Ames & Frye, Ward W. Waddell, Jr., and 
Alfred S. Wilkins for Respondent. 
CARTER, J.-A judgment of nonsuit, the subject of this 
appeal, was entered in plaintiff's action for the death of her 
husband, Virgil T. 'l'hompson, allegedly caused by the negli-
gence or wilful misconduct of Donald Kerns in operating a 
car in which Thompson was riding. The administrator of 
the Kerns' estate is defendant, plaintiff having dismissed 
the action as to defendants Kelley-Moyer 'rransportation 
Company and Charles Fogle. 
The sole issu<:Js are whether Thompson was a guest or pas-
senger in the car being driven by Kerns when Thompson, 
riding therein, met his death, and, if the former, whether 
Kerns was guilty of wilful misconduct thus being liable 
although Thompson was a guest. 
[1] No person who as a guest accepts a ride in a vehicle 
without giving compensation has a right of action for dam-
ages against the driver unless he establishes that the damages 
were caused by the intoxication or wilful misconduct of the 
driver. (Veh. Code, § 403.) [2] "The designations 'passenger' 
and 'guest' have been adopted for the purpose of distinguish-
ing a person who has given compensation within the mean-
ing of section 403 of the V chicle Code from one carried 
gratuitonsly. '' (Whitmore v. French, 37 Cal.2d 7 44, 7 46 
[235 P.2d 3] .) No question concerning Kerns' negligence is 
presented. 
At the time of the accident Kerns was driving his car with 
Thompson riding in the front seat with him and Mr. Dreis 
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in the back seat. In endeavoring to pass a car ahead of him 
in foggy weather, Kerns' car collided head on with an oncom-
ing truck. Kerns, Thompson and Dreis were employees of 
Arrowhead and Puritas "\Vater Company and were en route 
from San Diego to Los Angeles.·~ Kerns was manager for 
the company in the San Diego area. Under his supervision 
were Dreis and Thompson, each of whom was a sales super-
visor for a portion of that area; their duty was to supervise 
the selling and delivt'ry activities of salesmen selling and 
delivering bottled water, the company's product. Before the 
day of the accident, Kerns, Thompson and Dreis received 
notice from the company requesting that they attend a com-
pany meeting in Los Angeles of all the branch managers 
and sales supervisors. The meeting was one of a series of 
regular monthly meetings inaugurated in 1950 (prior to that 
time the meetings had been irregular) and it was necessary 
that all three attend because the matter to be considered was 
important to them and to the company in their work and 
its business. ·while there was no ''set'' policy for trans-
portation of the employees to the meetings, that is, they 
could come by private car or public transportation, as they 
chose, the company knew Thompson and Dreis had ridden 
with Kerns in the latter's car to attend several meetings and 
did not object. The company reimbursed the employees for 
expenses incurred in coming to the meetings, including an 
allowance of 7 cents a mile for the first 500 miles when a 
private car was nsed. The employee driving his car to the 
·meeting would get the mileage, and those riding with him 
would not, which was ''more economic'' for the company 
as expressed by Swanburg, the company's manager of all 
branches, and is plainly inferable from the evidence. 
[3] We have a situation then in which several employees 
of a company, in the course of their employment, are riding 
in tbe car of one of the employees for the purpose of attend-
ing a meeting called by the company in connection with its 
business. The employee owning the car receives mileage for 
its use in the employer's business from the employer. Al-
*The company is not a party to the action and it may be noted that 
an employee injured in the course of his employment by the negligence 
of his employer's agent may recover damages from the agent in a civil 
action, as the agent is considered a third person or a person other than 
the employer under the workmen's compensation laws. (Wallace v. Pa-
cific Electdc Ry. Co., 105 Oal.App. 664 [288 P. 834]; see Baugh v. Rogers, 
24 Oa1.2d 200 [148 P.2d 633, 152 A.L.R. 1043]; Lab. Code, § 3852 et seq.) 
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though it may be small, clearly the owner of the car receives 
a tangible benefit from the employer. While he would have 
received the same amount whether or not he carried other 
employees with him, the fact remains that he did receive it 
under conditions in which he \Yas transporting other employees 
on the employer's business and his employer knew he engaged 
in that practice. It may be inferred that Thompson and 
Dreis went to the meeting with Kerns because they con-
sidered a suggestion by him that they do so as a command 
inasmuch as he was their supervisor. The company thereby 
received an economic brnefit because it would pay less trav-
eling expenses to its employees attending the meeting by 
reason of the arrangement whereby only one employee (Kerns, 
the owner of the car) would receive mileage, since the em-
ployer, in effect, was paying the one employee to bring the 
others to the meeting. This means that the one driving the 
car would receive a benefit for supplying transportation to 
a fellow employee, not from the fellow employee but from 
his employer. [4] \lYe know of no authority, however, 
which holds that compensation for the transportation must 
be paid by the one transported in order to make it trans-
portation for compensation under section 403 of the Vehicle 
Code. The compensation may be paid by someone other than 
the rider. (Malloy v. Fang, 37 Cal.2d 356 [232 P.2d 241] ; 
Whitechat v. Guyette, 19 Cal.2d 428 [122 P.2d 47] .) 
[5] Even if Kerns had not received mileage there is a 
sound basis for holding Thompson to be his passenger rather 
than a guest. It vms for the mutual economic benefit of all, 
Thompson, Kerns, Dreis, and the company, that the three 
go to the meeting because of the relationship between them 
and the nature and purpose of the meetings and the regular 
occurrence thereof. In 2WaUoy v. Fong, supra, 37 Cal.2d 356, 
defendant Fong was transporting a child to a defendant 
church playground, performing the duties of defendant Antis-
dale, the pastor of the church, when plaintiff was injured 
as a result of Fong's negligence. \Ve there said (p. 376): 
"It is immaterial that Fong performed the services gratui-
tously; he performed those services as the agent of the 
Presbytery in discharging Antisdale's duty to transport the 
children to the playground for their recreation period. It is 
snfficient therefore if Antisdale, the church, or the Presbytery 
received a benefit from the transportation of plaintiff to the 
playground. 
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''The transportation of plaintiff to the playground for the 
recreation period was not an isolated transaction; it was an 
integral part of the conduct of the Bible school as one of 
the normal activities of the San Mateo Presbyterian Church. 
It is undisputed that the attendance of the children at the 
Bible school was at least of mutual benefit to the children 
and the church. The conduct of such schools was authorized 
by the church laws, and it was to the interest of the church 
and the Presbytery that parents send their children to the 
school. A.ntisdale had a large number of handbills printed 
urging attendance at the school. The children had recently 
been released from secular schools for their summer vacation, 
and many parents wanted their children to spend the time 
in the open air. It is not an unreasonable inference that 
the daily open-air recreation periods were designed to induce 
these parents to send their children to the school and did 
induce them to do so. Such an inference negatives the theory 
that no compensation was given for the transportation to 
such recreation periods. '[B]enefits or considerations other 
than cash or its equivalent may be ''compensation.'' . . . ' '' 
Similarly here it may be inferred that Kerns was acting for 
the company in transporting Thompson and Dreis to the 
meeting and that the transportation was for the mutual 
economic benefit of all concerned. (See Whitechat v. Guy-
ette, supra, 19 Cal.2d 428.) 
[6] It may reasonably be inferred that while the benefits 
received by Kerns, the driver, may not have been the sole 
motivating influence, they were motivating influences of a 
substantial character. "Where, ... the driver receives a 
tangible benefit, monetary or otherwise, which is a motivating 
influence for furnishing the transportation, the rider is a 
passenger and the driver is liable for ordinary negligence. 
(See Kruzie v. Sanders, 23 Cal.2d 237 [143 P.2d 704]; Dru-
zanich v. Oriley, 19 Cal.2d 439 [122 P.2d 53] ; Whitechat v. 
Guyette, 19 Cal.2d 428 [122 P.2d 47]; Walker v. A.darnson, 
9 Cal.2d 287 (70 P.2d 914] ; Kertstetter v. Elfrnan, 327 Pa. 
17 [192 A.. 663, 664-666].)" (WhitrnMe v. French, supra, 
37 Cal.2d 744, 746; see, also, Kruzie v. Sanders, 23 Cal.2d 
237 [143 P.2d 704]; II-urnphreys v. San Francisco Area 
Council, Boy Scouts, 22 Cal.2d 436 [139 P.2d 941].) 
The instant case has factors not present in Druzanich v. 
Oriley, supra, 19 Cal.2d 439, which support plaintiff's posi-
tion here. 
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Inasmuch as we have concluded that there was sufficient 
evidence to show that Thompson was a passenger it is not 
necessary to consider plaintiff's contention that the evidencr 
is sufficient to show wilful misconduct on the part of Krrns. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., 
concurred. 
[L. A. No. 22902. In Bank. Mar. 5, 1954.] 
AURELIA ARMEN'fA et al., Appellants, v. DALE 
CHURCHILL et al., Respondents. 
[1] Highways-Construction-Work of Construction or Repair.-
Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 8, art. 2, § 1506, declaring that "Con-
struction Safety Orders" included in such title are applicable 
to "the excavation, construction, alteration, repairing, reno-
vating, removal or wrecking of buildings or otl1er structures," 
applies to the repair and resurfacing of a highway. 
[2] Automobiles-Backing: Signals and Warnings.-Construction 
Safety Order 1753(b) of Cal. Admin. Code, declaring that 
trucks used to haul construction material shall be equipped 
with a horn, bell or whistle and that "the warning will be 
sounded while the truck is backing up," was issued by Division 
of Industrial Safety in conformity with provisions of Lab. 
Code, §§ 6312, 6500, as a measure for protection and safety of 
workmen who cannot be expected to keep constantly on look-
out for backing trucks. 
[3] Constitutional Law-Equal Protection of Laws-Classification. 
-The Constitution does not prohibit legislative classification; 
the mere production of inequality which necessarily results to 
some degree in every selection of persons for regulation does 
not place classification within constitutional prohibition. 
[4] Automobiles-Backing: Signals and Warnings.-Construction 
Safety Order 1753(b) of Cal. Admin. Code, declaring that 
trucks used to haul construction material should be equipped 
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, § 272 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Consti.tutional Law, § 476 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Highways, § 72; [2, 4-8] Automo-
biles, §§ 91, 103; [3] Constitutional Law, § 149; [9] Statutes, 
§ 194; [10] Evidence, § 33; [11] Automobiles, §§ 202, 318, 325; 
[12] Automobiles, § 318; [13-15] Automobiles, § 202; [16] Evi-
dence, § 307. 
